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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONGRESSIONAL
SOCIAL POLICYMAKING:
UNITED STA TES v. EICHMAN
AND
TEXAS v. JOHNSON
GEORGE STEVEN SWAN, S.J.D.t
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v Eichman ', announced
on June 11, 1990,2 rekindled a firestorm of controversy which had been
smoldering since the 1989 Supreme Court opinion in Texas v. Johnson.3
That precedent had found unconstitutional as contrary to the first
amendment4 a political protester's conviction for burning the American
flag in violation of the Texas statute prohibiting desecration of a vener-
ated object.' Congress had responded by passing at once the Flag Pro-
tection Act of 1989,6 which pointedly provided for speedy Supreme
Court review of any Constitutional challenges to it.7 In Eichman, the
Supreme Court produced essentially the same decision as it had in John-
t Associate Professor, North Carolina A & T State University School of Business; Ohio State
University, B.A. 1970; Notre Dame University, J.D. 1974; University of Toronto, LL.M. 1976;
S.J.D. 1983; member Ohio bar.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
2. But the main event of June 11, 1990, was Texas Ranger great Nolan Ryan's sixth no hitter
(5-0), walking two and striking out fourteen. Supreme Court recognition of Ryanesque heroes is
found in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972), and in B. WOODWARD AND S. ARMSTRONG,
THE BRETHREN 189-92 (1979). A lawyer might rhapsodize that baseball most appropriately is
America's national pastime, being a federalist balance of teamwork and individualism:
The distinctiveness of its component actions - pitching, hitting, fielding, and base-running -
makes them available to separate attention, measurement, analysis, and judgment. Every
player's contribution to every play is recorded and given value. The statistics are rarely mis-
leading. If you want to know who the American League's best second baseman of the Thirties
was, well, as Casey Stengel used to say, "[y]ou could look it up." Try that with defensive
linemen.
Sobran, The Republic of Baseball, NAT'L REV., June 11, 1990, at 36, 38. Baseball places every
player of the hour within a conservative history: "It]he statistical discreetness of individual perform-
ance, set against the game's stable history, gives achievement in baseball a permanence and stature
other sports can seldom confer." Id. at 39.
3. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
5. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (Vernon 1989).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 700(d)(l)-(2) (Supp. 1990).
1
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son.8 An immediate congressional effort to insert an anti-flagbuming
amendment 9 into the Constitution failed for lack of the necessary two-
thirds majority in both Houses.'° However, no move was ever seriously
made to reform the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Ar-
ticle III, section two, exceptions clause.
1
The following discussion reviews this history with an eye to the polit-
ical economy dynamics informing these respective performances of the
Supreme Court and Congress. It will be shown that the Supreme Court
and Congress have divided national policymaking to their mutual advan-
tage. Not only was the Eichman opinion foreseeable, but so was the fail-
ure of Congress to reverse Eichman by democratic means.
II. THE TEXAS v. JOHNSON MAJORITY OPINION
During the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas,
Gregory Lee Johnson participated in a political demonstration, the "Re-
publican War Chest Tour." 2 The participants protested the policies of
President Ronald Reagan and of certain corporations based in Dallas.
Chanting political slogans and stopping at several corporate sites to stage
"die-ins" to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war, the demonstra-
tors marched through the streets of Dallas. 3 In front of the Dallas City
Hall, "Johnson unfurled [an] American flag, doused it with kerosene,
and set it [a]fire."' 14 As the flag burned, the protestors chanted,
"America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you."
1 5
Johnson was charged with the Texas criminal offense' 6 of desecration
of a venerated object.' 7 Johnson was convicted, and his conviction was
affirmed by the Texas Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for Dallas.' 8 The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, reversed. 9 The court held
that Johnson could not, consistent with the first amendment, be punished
for burning the flag under the statute as applied to him.2' In 1988 the
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.2 '
The question before the Supreme Court was whether Johnson's convic-
8. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
9. Biskupic, Congress Snaps to Attention Over New Flag Proposal, CONG. Q., June 16, 1990, at
1877.
10. U.S. CONST. art. V.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.




16. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (Vernon 1989).
17. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400.
18. Johnson v. State, 706 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App. 1986).
19. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
20. Id.
21. Texas v. Johnson, 488 U.S. 907 (1988).
1991]
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tion comported with the first amendment;22 therefore, the Court initially
had to ascertain whether his flag burning constituted expressive conduct
permitting Johnson to invoke the first amendment.23 For the purpose of
oral argument, the State of Texas conceded that Johnson's conduct was
expressive conduct, a concession the Supreme Court accepted as pru-
dent.24 The Supreme Court also noticed that the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals had found the overtly political nature of his conduct was
both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent, which did implicate the
first amendment.25
The next issue was whether Texas's regulation "related to the suppres-
sion of free expression."' 26 The government has a freer hand, generally,
in curtailing expressive conduct than in restricting the spoken or written
word. 2' Nevertheless, the government may not restrict specific conduct
because it entails expressive elements.2" The Justices were to determine
whether Texas had asserted an interest in support of Johnson's convic-
tion which was unrelated to suppressing expression.29
Texas claimed that its interest in forestalling breaches of the peace jus-
tified Johnson's flag desecration conviction.3" But the law countenances
no presumption that an audience taking grave offense at particular ex-
pression is necessarily likely to so disturb the peace that the expression
may be proscribed on that ground.3 "Nor [did] Johnson's expressive
conduct fall within [the] small class of 'fighting words' ,32 likely to trig-
ger breach of the peace by provoking the average person to reprisal.33
Consequently, Texas's interest in the maintenance of order was not im-
plicated on the Johnson facts.34
Texas also advanced the interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
national unity. But this interest related to expression in Johnson's case. 35
The state's asserted interest, therefore, was subjected to the most rigor-
ous scrutiny.36
22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (1989).
23. Id. at 404.
24. Id. at 405-406.
25. Id. at 406 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
26. Id. at 407.
27. Id. at 406 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
28. Id. (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd sub. nor, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984)).
29. Id. at 407.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 409.
32. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 410.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 410-411 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
3
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A bedrock principle of the first amendment is that government may
not proscribe the expression of an idea simply because society finds it
offensive;37 involvement of the flag engenders no exception. 38 "A state
may [not] foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive con-
duct relating" to it.39 The Court noted that to conclude that government
may confine designated symbols to signal only a limited range of
messages would risk entering territory without defensible or discernable
boundaries.' Texas's interest in preserving the flag as a national unity
symbol did not justify Johnson's conviction for engaging in political
expression.4
As Justice Brennan added:
[w]e are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished
place in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our hold-
ing today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom
and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our
toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of our
strength. Indeed, one of the proudest images of our flag, the one immor-
talized in our own national anthem, is of the bombardment it survived at
Fort McHenry. It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas
sees reflected in the flag - and it is that resilience that we reassert
today.42
Justice Kennedy briefly concurred, without reservation, in Brennan's
opinion, and without citing any authorities. Kennedy's concurrence is of
interest by demonstrating the personal dimensions of the case, which he
found "exacts its personal toll."'43 He submitted that "[t]he hard fact is
that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like."" He further
stated, "we do not pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for
fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision.
'45
Justice Kennedy continued by noting that among those "dismayed" by
the majority holding would be those who defended the flag in battle.'
Kennedy found the Johnson judgment painful to announce, noting "[i]t is
poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in
contempt.
47
37. Id. at 414.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 415.
40. Id. at 416.
41. Id. at 420.
42. Id. at 419.
43. Id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44. Id.
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III. THE TEXAS V. JOHNSON DISSENTS
The dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist, which was joined by Justices
White and O'Connor, was remarkable. It acidly condemns the conclu-
sion of the Brennan opinion as:
a regrettably patronizing civics lecture, presumably addressed to the
Members of both Houses of Congress, the members of the 48 state legis-
latures that enacted prohibitions against flag burning, and the troops
fighting under that flag in Vietnam who objected to its being burned....
The Court's role as the final expositor of the Constitution is well estab-
lished, but its role as a platonic guardian admonishing those responsible
to public opinion as if they were truant school children has no similar
place in our system of government.48
Approximately the initial third of this dissent is a historical collage
including the following: the opening lines of Ralph Waldo Emerson's
poem Concord Hymn,4 9 the 1812 British burning of Washington and at-
tack on Fort McHenry and the first stanza of The Star Spangled Ban-
ner,5" the 1861 lowering of the flag at Fort Sumter, the Confederacy's
Stars and Bars,51 and the entirety of John Greenleaf Whittier's poem
Barbara Frietchie,52 and then goes on to mentions of Iwo Jima's Mount
Suribachi," President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Korean War am-
phibious landing at Inchon. 4 The legend of Betsy Ross was omitted.
Rehnquist proceeds to remind the Justices of the two flags in their
courtroom, and of the flags decorating graves on Memorial Day." He
refers to Flag Day, to John Philip Sousa's The Stars and Stripes Forever,
and to the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag.56 The Chief Justice denies
that the flag simply represents an idea or viewpoint jostling to be recog-
nized in the "marketplace of ideas. ' "
Rehnquist argued that Johnson's public burning of the American flag
tended to incite a breach of the peace:58 as it is with fighting words, so it
is with flagburning, for first amendment purposes.59 Rehnquist found
48. Id. at 428 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 422.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 424. This was not the first but the second time that poem in its entirety has visited
itself upon topmost national councils. On May 15, 1943, British Prime Minister Winston S. Church-
ill spontaneously recited the poem from memory, without having read it for thirty years, for Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Harry Hopkins. W. CHURCHILL, THE HINGE
OF FATE 795-96 (1950); R. PILPEL, CHURCHILL IN AMERICA: 1895-1961, 182-83 (1976).
53. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 426 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 427.
57. Id. at 429.
58. Id. at 430.
59. Id. at 431.
5
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flagburning to be no essential part of the "exposition of ideas," and to be
of a social benefit so trivial as to be clearly outweighed by the public
stake in avoiding a probable breach of the peace. 6°
"It was Johnson's use of this particular symbol, and not the idea that
he sought to convey" via the symbol, that is sanctioned. 6' Besides,
flagburning is so noncommunicative it is likely to be indulged in by par-
ticipants not to convey any particular thought, but to antagonize
others.62
Prior cases dealing with flag desecration statutes had left open the
Johnson issue.63 But Chief Justice Rehnquist cites" past dissents by
Chief Justice Earl Warren,65 and by Justices Hugo Black,6 6 Abe Fortas,6 7
and Harry A. Blackmun.6' He likewise draws upon a concurrence by
Justice Byron White.69
Justice Stevens's separate dissent, as if anticipating Eichman, identified
the problem as whether either Texas "or indeed the federal govern-
ment" 7° can prohibit public desecration of the flag:
71
The question is unique. In my judgment rules that apply to a host of
other symbols, such as state flags, armbands, or various privately pro-
moted emblems of political or commercial identity, are not necessarily
controlling. Even if flag burning could be considered just another species
of symbolic speech under the logical application of the rules that the
Court has developed in its interpretation of the First Amendment in
other contexts, this case has an intangible dimension that makes those
rules inapplicable.
7 2
Stevens went on to argue that the statutory proscription of flag dese-
cration does not prescribe orthodoxy in politics or other matters of opin-
ion, nor does it force citizens to confess by word or deed their belief
therein. 73 Stevens believed the Johnson case had naught to do with disa-
greeable ideas, but hinged upon disagreeable conduct diminishing the
value of an important national asset. 74 As such, Stevens concluded that
the flag could not be undeserving of protection from desecration. 75
60. Id. (citations omitted).




65. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 610 (Black, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 615-17 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
68. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 590 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 583 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
70. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 436 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 437.
74. Id. at 438.
75. Id. at 439.
6
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IV. UNITED STATES V. EICHMAN
A. Johnson Redux
Following the Johnson decision Congress passed the Flag Protection
Act of 1989:
(a)(1) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns,
maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United
States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the dis-
posal of a flag when it has become worn or soiled.
(b) As used in this section, the term "flag of the United States" means
any flag of the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance,
of any size, in a form that is commonly displayed.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession, or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of jurisdiction over any offense over
which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of this section.
(d)(1) An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States from any interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order
issued by a United States district court ruling upon the constitutionality
of subsection (a).
(2) The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on the ques-
tion, accept jurisdiction over the appeal and advance on the docket and
expedite to the greatest extent possible.
76
Thereafter, the United States prosecuted certain protestors for violat-
ing the Act by setting the flag afire.7 7 These cases were decided in the
Supreme Court's 1990 opinion in United States v. Eichman.7 s
The government, the appellant in Eichman, conceded that the appel-
lees' flagburning constituted expressive conduct. However, it asked the
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in Johnson, and find that
flagburning, while a means of expression, should be treated like fighting
words or obscenity, and should not enjoy full first amendment protec-
tion. But the Supreme Court, split along lines identical to those in John-
son, in a majority opinion by Justice Brennan, declined the government's
invitation to so decide.79
The sole remaining query for the Court was whether the Flag Protec-
tion Act was sufficiently distinct from the Texas statute that it could be
constitutionally applied to proscribe the appellees' expressive conduct."0
The government argued that the Flag Protection Act, unlike the statute
76. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989).
77. United States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct. 2404 (1990).
78. Id. at 2405.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2408.
7
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in Johnson, did not target expressive conduct on the basis of message
content and was, therefore, constitutional. The government posited an
interest in protecting the physical integrity of the flag, to safeguard it as
unalloyed symbol of the nation. The Act, the Court found, proscribed
conduct damaging a flag, regardless of a defendant's motive or message,
or of the likely effect of the defendant's conduct on onlookers. The Texas
statute had barred only desecration which a defendant knew would seri-
ously offend onlookers.8 '
The Court found that while the Flag Protection Act included no ex-
press, content-linked restriction on the compass of prohibited conduct,
the government's underlying interest is itself tied to suppressing free ex-
pression." The Court found that mere disfigurement of a physical sym-
bol, such as by destroying a flag secretly, would not diminish the symbol.
Therefore, the government's announced interest would be implicated
only if a defendant's treatment of the banner actually communicates to
others a message inconsistent with those ideals the flag reflects . 3
Also, the Court looked to the very verbs of the Act, such as "muti-
lates, defaces, defiles,"8 4 which targeted disrespect on a defendant's part
in the act of flagburning.85 An explicit exemption for disposal of worn or
soiled flags 6 protects acts traditionally associated with patriotic rever-
ence for the flag.87 The Act suppressed expression only in light of its
communicative impact.8 Since the Act's restriction on expression could
be justified only with regard to the content of the communication, hence
the focus on the governmental interest behind the statute, the Act was
strictly scrutinized. 9 The Court found that the government's interest
could not justify its infringement upon a first amendment right;9° the
Court held that the Act could not constitutionally be applied to the
appellees. 9'
B. The Eichman Dissent
Justice Stevens explained for the dissenters that the majority essen-
tially did no more than reconfirm what it already had decided.92 Con-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2408 (citing Brief for United States at 28, 29, United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct.
2404).
83. Id. at 2409.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)(1) (1989).
85. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)(2) (1989).
87. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2405.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2407
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1991]
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1991], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol19/iss2/3
154 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:146
trary to the position asserted by the Johnson flagburners, Stevens noted
that it was admitted in Eichman that the federal government has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting the national flag's symbolic value.93 The ini-
tial issue for the Court was whether the interest in safeguarding the
worth of the symbol was unrelated to suppressing ideas the flagbuners
attempt to share.94 Stevens argued the government's legitimate interest
in preserving the flag's symbolic value is basically the same, no matter
what ideas may have triggered a specific flagburning.95 Stevens argued
the government may, and should, shield the symbolic value of the flag,
whatever the specific content of the flagburners' speech. 96
For Stevens, the controversy boiled down to a judgment question of
whether "the admittedly important interest in allowing every speaker to
choose the method of expressing his or her ideas that he or she deems
most effective and appropriate outweigh[s] the societal interest in pre-
serving the symbolic value of the flag?" 97 The dissenters answered this
question in the negative.
98
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EICHMAN
The key to Eichman resides neither in its text nor that of the Johnson
opinion, a precedent so close to Eichman that its dissenters speculated
that "it might be appropriate to defer to the judgment of the majority
and merely apply the doctrine of stare decisis to the case at hand." 99 The
real substance of Eichman is tucked away in the footnotes.
The Eichman majority noted, "[w]e deal here with concededly polit-
ical speech and have no occasion to pass on the validity of laws regulat-
ing commercial exploitation of the image of the United States flag.'
The note cites the 1907 Supreme Court opinion in Halter v. Nebraska.'
The Johnson majority noted that the Halter case had addressed the valid-
ity of a state law proscribing certain commercial exploitation of the
flag.'12 The Halter case had transpired years before the Supreme Court
had first applied the first amendment to states.10 3 "More important, as
we continually emphasized in Halter itself, that case involved purely
93. Id. at 2410.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2411.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2412.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2408 n.4.
101. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
102. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2545 n.10 (1989).
103. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9
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commercial rather than political speech. '' 1
As the first Justice Harlan stated for the Supreme Court in Halter:
It is familiar law that even the privileges of citizenship and the rights
inhering in personal liberty are subject, in their enjoyment, to such rea-
sonable restraints as may be required for the general good. Nor can we
hold that anyone has a right of property which is violated by such an
enactment as the one in question. If it be said that there is a right of
property in the tangible thing upon which a representation of the flag has
been placed, the answer is that such representation - which, in itself,
cannot belong, as property, to an individual - has been placed on such
thing in violation of law, and subject to the power of government to pro-
hibit its use for purposes of advertisement.
The key to Eichman, and even to Halter, is that democratically-elected
politicians make popular economic policy, not divisive social policy, un-
checked by the federal judiciary. Hence the Eichman references to ac-
ceptable "laws regulating commercial exploitation,"'" and Halter's
approving reference to the power of the government to prohibit the flag's
use "for purposes of advertisement" resulted.'0 7
Dissenting in Johnson, Chief Justice Rehnquist sputtered that only two
terms previously the Supreme Court had held in San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,' that Congress
could grant exclusive use of the word "Olympic" to the U.S. Olympic
Committee (U.S.O.C.). The Supreme Court had stated therein that if
a word acquires value as a result of the organization and the expenditure
of labor, skill, and money of an entity, that entity may, constitutionally,
obtain a limited property right in the symbol. 110 "Surely Congress or the
States may recognize a similar interest in the flag.""'
In United States Olympic Committee,1 2 the Amateur Sports Act' 
3
had indeed granted the U.S.O.C. the right to prohibit certain commercial
and promotional uses of the word "Olympic" and various Olympic sym-
bols. As Justice Powell's opinion for the majority declared, once again in
a footnote, "[t]here is no basis in the record to believe that the Act will be
interpreted or applied to infringe significantly on noncommercial speech
rights."'' 4
104. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2545 n.10 (citing Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907)).
105. Halter, 205 U.S. at 42-43.
106. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2405, 2445 (1990).
107. Halter, 205 U.S. at 43.
108. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
109. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing San Francisco Arts & Ath-
letics, Inc., v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987)).
110. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 536 n.15.
111. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
112. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
113. 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1988).
114. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 536 n.15.
10
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The key to Johnson and to United States Olympic Committee is, again,
that democratically-elected politicians, especially those in Congress,
make economic policy decisions, which are unchecked by the federal ju-
diciary. The federal judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, is the body
which makes national social policy, such as policy over flagburning;
hence, Powell's United States Olympic Committee footnote distinguishing
"noncommercial speech rights,""' 5 and Brennan's Eichman footnote in-
voking the Halter contrast of "purely commercial rather than political
speech.""16
VI. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONGRESSIONAL SOCIAL
POLICYMAKING
A. The 1990 Offensive to Amend the Constitution
Within an hour of the Eichman decision, President George Bush an-
nounced that he would press for a constitutional amendment against
flagburning. "7 The proposed amendment provided that "Congress and
the states shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the
flag of the United States."
'"18
In June, the House Judiciary Committee sent the proposed amend-
ment to the House floor without a recommendation. 1 9 After a five hour
debate, 20 the House, on June 21, voted 254 in favor of the amendment,
while 177 opposed.' 2 ' The proposal fell 34 votes short of the two-
thirds'2 2 required in each house123 for congressional proposal of a consti-
tutional amendment.
124
Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley took the unusual action of
casting a vote against the proposed amendment. 125 Traditionally, the
Speaker rarely votes except to break ties. 126 Speaker Foley, as widely
reported, boasted, in opposing the amendment, that while every nation
115. See id. and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 98-102 and accompanying text.
117. Nelson, Flag Burning Perfect Non-Issue in an Election Year, LIBERAL OPINION WEEK,
June 25, 1990, at 15, col. 1.
118. Biskupic, Congress Snaps to Attention Over New Flag Proposal, CONG. Q., June 16, 1990, at
1877.
119. Ferguson, House Vote of 254-177 Kills Amendment Prohibiting Desecration of US. Flag,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 1990, at AI0, col. 1.
120. Holmes, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
121. Id.
122. Wolf, House Ends Flap Over Flag, USA TODAY, June 22-24, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
123. U.S. CONST. art. V.
124. Holmes, supra note 112.
125. Id. at A14, col. 1.
126. Id.
11
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has a flag, the United States alone has a Bill of Rights. 127 The negative
votes reached the 145 necessary to defeat the measure in just ten minutes,
although fifteen minutes are allocated for voting. 2 1 When a vote fails or
passes well before the allotted time, undecided members reap a political
windfall in that the guaranteed outcome allows them to choose the safer
political alternative.
29
The measure failed in the Senate, nine Senators shy of the required
two-thirds majority. t3° The two days of debate preceding the vote were
largely perfunctory;' 3 ' following the failure of the amendment in the
House, the Senate's action was primarily symbolic. 3 ' These June efforts
in the Congress highlight the political economy of the Supreme Court-
Congress division of labor.
The proper difficulty of amending the Constitution in the wake of a
Supreme Court opinion emerged anew in the 1990 failure of the Flag
Protection Amendment, despite its popularity with the public. Congres-
sional proponents of the amendment, and even the President himself,
made a bid for public support as social policymakers attempting to make
policy by the most dramatic and fundamental means known to the law
- amending the Constitution - despite the heavy procedural obstacles
presented to any amendment. But assessment of these June 1990 events
in the long range perspective of the Supreme Court-Congress division of
labor raises the question of whether, or how far, Congress dares to make
social policy.
B. The Supreme Court-Congress Division of Labor
i. The Exceptions Clause
For the two democratic branches of the federal government to regu-
larly respond to controversial Supreme Court constitutional decisions
with fresh constitutional amendments would be ill-advised. An overly
127. Rasky, Foley Vindicated by Vote on Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at A14, col. 6; Con-
gress: The Flag Boosters Get Burned, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 24.
This signalled that while the Speaker, the son of a judge, Ferguson, supra note 119 at A 10, col. 2.,
may know a good deal about flags, he could brush up on bills of rights. See. e.g., Swan, Article III,
Section 2, Exceptions Clause Canadian Constitutional Parallels: Canada Teaches the United States
an American History Lesson, 13 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 37 (1983) (concerning Canada's 1982 Charter
of Rights and Freedoms).
In all fairness to speaker Foley, a more reliable source reported that: -[e]very country has a flag.
We are one of the few countries that has a Bill of Rights." Biskupic, supra note 118.
128. Ferguson, supra note 119, at AI0, col. 2.
129. Id.
130. On June 26, the vote against the proposed amendment was 58 Senators in favor, 42 op-
posed. Phillips, Flag Amendment Fails to Pass Senate Test, USA TODAY, June 27, 1990, at A4, col.
2.
131. What's News-.- World-Wide, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
132. Senate Rejects New Move to Outlaw Flag Burning, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1990, at A 1, col.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1991], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol19/iss2/3
158 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:146
mutable constitution would too little protect citizens from the tyranny of
passionate but perhaps ephemeral majorities. On the other hand, a con-
stitution virtually impossible to amend, such as in retort to five to four
vote social policy decisions by the Supreme Court, would too seriously
frustrate democratic self-determination. There ought to be some com-
promise. There is.
The Article III, section 2, exceptions clause provides that "[t]he
Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make."' 33 During the Maryland Convention on ratifying the Constitu-
tion, A. Contee Hanson argued that under Article III, Congress enjoys
plenary power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 34
On June 18, 1788, at the Virginia Convention, young delegate John
Marshall similarly offered that, "Congress is empowered to make excep-
tions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme
Court - These exceptions certainly go as far as the Legislature may
think proper, for the interest and liberty of the people." 3 ' He referred to
"the wisdom and integrity of the Legislature, because we call them to
rectify defects."'
' 36
The 1989 Congressional majority need not have replied to the Supreme
Court's Johnson opinion with the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989,
which was struck down in Eichman. Congress, in 1989, could have in-
stead, by simple majority vote in each house, framed a narrowly-drawn
flagburning jurisdictional exception for the federal appellate courts.
This would not have invited the mere rerun of the Johnson appraisal of
the first amendment dimensions of flagburning as obtained in Eich-
man, 37 and would have precluded the disquieting prospect of amending
the federal Bill of Rights during 1990. This course would have left the
Supreme Court of each state as the final interpreter of the still-control-
ling national Constitution, within the confines of its own state. This
would not have deputized Congress as arbiter of the Constitution, but
would only have fulfilled the congressional function of choosing whether,
or how far, the state or the federal judiciaries would be the ultimate arbi-
ter of the Constitution belonging to Americans throughout these United
States, by its control of the federal appellate jurisdiction.
Indeed, in June 1990, the House of Representatives and Senate simple
133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
134. E. KEYNES, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION 79 (1989).
135. 1 J. MARSHALL, THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 283 (H. Johnson ed. 1974).
136. Id.
137. "[A]nd Justice Brennan's decision striking down the federal flag desecration law was based
almost entirely on the ruling a year ago invalidating the Texas flag law." Wermiel, Liberal Justices
Are Losing Their Voice As Influence on Pivotal Decisions Fades, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1990, at BI,
B3, col. 3.
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majorities voted 254 and 58 respectively, purportedly endorsing the pro-
tection of the flag from burning. 38  Yet, Congressional exercise of its
exceptions clause muscle received widespread consideration at no time.
ii. Congressional Disuse of the Exceptions Clause
Since approximately the time of the Supreme Court's 1936 opinion in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,139 there has evolved an effectively
plenary presidential power in foreign policymaking: witness the late 1990
blockade of Iraq. Since approximately the time of the Supreme Court's
1937 opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.,14 there has
evolved an effectively plenary congressional power in economic poli-
cymaking. And, since approximately the time of the Supreme Court's
1938 opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,' 4  there has
evolved an effectively plenary Supreme Court power in social
policymaking.
This last point explains why the 1989 congressional majority passing
the Flag Protection Act of 1989, and the two-house congressional simple
majorities voting in favor of a constitutional amendment in 1990, fail to
translate into an exceptions clause jurisdictional regulation statute. Con-
gress covets the popular role of economic policymaker; no republican
nation has ever repealed its welfare state. 142 Congress, however, simulta-
neously fears the seething lavas of social policymaking.
Congress, composed of politicians, prefers to let the Supreme Court
take the social policy heat, at the expense of the states over whose peo-
ples social policy tends to be made.' 43 Daniel Elazar, the well-known
expert on federalism,' 44 recently observed that since World War 11 the
states increasingly have been denied by Supreme Court decisions their
historic constitutional powers to underpin one or another particular
moral order. 145 The powers of state governments have been frustrated in
matters relating to transcendent moral issues, such as the church-state
relationship, pornography, the right to life, and weekly days of rest.'"
138. The wary term "purportedly" is requisite, to be sure, given the political windfall mentioned
in Section VIA above. Such windfalls allow legislators the luxury of voting the more popular way -
because the outcome is a foregone conclusion - notwithstanding their own personal preferences.
139. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
140. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
141. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
142. "[A]nother deeply rooted aspect of contemporary politics -the welfare state, whose benefits
no majority in any democratic country has yet foresworn." Kirkpatrick, Why the New Right Lost,
COMMENTARY, February 1977, 34, 39.
143. E.g., the people of Texas in Johnson.
144. Daniel J. Elazar is author or editor of the following: D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERAL-
ISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984); D. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM (1987);
FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION (D. Elazar ed. 1984).
145. D. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 175 (1988).
146. Id. at 175-76.
1991]
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In such cases as school prayer and abortion, the Supreme Court imposed
its own reading of the Constitution against the wishes of both the people
and the states. 147 The people, however, have been sufficiently divided to
prevent reassertion of state authority in any specific policy field wherein
constituency of conscience issues predominate. 148 This leaves the stage
set for the post-Carolene Products social policymaking role of the
Supreme Court in the Supreme Court-Congressional division of labor.
Since the New Deal, the central government has undertaken to estab-
lish a new constitutional paradigm for the nation. The trend for the past
half-century has been to constrict traditional individual liberties in con-
nection with the right to property, and with freedom of association. This
trend was facilitated by the Supreme Court.'49 This post-New Deal pop-
ular shuffiing of property claims represents the economic policymaking
role assigned to Congress in the Supreme Court-Congress division of la-
bor. Hence, the court's attention rendered to the Halter precedent, and
especially its attention to the United States Olympic Committee prece-
dent, discussed in section V above.
This is, to reemphasize, why Congress would not invoke the exceptions
clause over these past two years, preferring to hurriedly pass a 1989 stat-
ute, itself at the mercy of the five-Justice Johnson majority which was
repeated in Eichman, and to ostentatiously attempt a 1990 constitutional
amendment. To utilize the exceptions clause in so prominent a show-
down would alert the electorate to the democratic third alternative of the
exceptions clause. That would be an alternative first, to plenary judicial
social policymaking and, second, to the virtually impossible amendment
process. Congress recoils from so educating the populace. Senators and
Representatives are exquisitely sensitive to the law of self-preservation, if
not to constitutional law. They fear repeatedly voting on prospective ju-
risdictional reforms as to weekly days of rest, school prayer, obscenity,
creation science, affirmative action, capital punishment, et cetera.
Hence, the 1989 statute and the 1990 constitutional amendment endeav-
ors, both ignoring the exceptions clause option, exemplified not explicit
congressional opposition to, but implicit congressional acquiescence in,
continuing Supreme Court social policymaking.
147. Id. Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School recalls:
So it seems a serious mistake to assume that the partial success of legislative reform move-
ments in a few key states would have been replicated elsewhere if Roe v. Wade had not inter-
vened.... Indeed, it is instructive in this regard that between 1971 and 1973 not one additional
state moved to repeal its criminal prohibition on abortion early in pregnancy.
[Tihere is little evidence that the United States was on the verge of emerging, in the early
1970's, from the long shadow of shame that had branded women as blameworthy for extramari-
tal sex and nonprocreative sex and that condemned them for choosing abortion even when the
choice was a painful and profoundly reluctant one. L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
ABSOLUTES (1990).
148. D. ELAZAR, supra note 145, at 176.
149. Id.
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iii. The Lesson of Eichman
The author of the pro-First Amendment/pro-flagburners briefs in-
forming the Eichman opinion was David Cole, who teaches constitu-
tional law at the Georgetown University Law Center. He afterward
found of Eichman, "[y]ou go through law school learning that all of law
is politics. What this case shows is that courts matter, that they place
internal constraints even on conservative judges."150
Actually, Eichman evidences the converse. Eichman simply illustrates
the Supreme Court's post-Carolene Products unchecked social poli-
cymaking role in the Supreme Court-Congress division of labor. Eich-
man constitutes social policymaking by strategic methods, albeit perhaps
not with the tactical result that Congress most desires. Eichman, to be
precise, presents to the Congress a politics of hot potato social poli-
cymaking isolated from the pesky nuisance of democracy. The self-re-
garding Congress, by failing to exercise its plenary exceptions clause
authority, which acts as a "check" to balance the federal judiciary, most
timorously prefers it thus.
Compare Cole's own observation that past legislative initiatives in the
post-Curtiss- Wright fields of war powers, international agreements, and
trade relations could be construed to evidence that Congress cares in the
abstract 1 ' about sharing foreign policymaking.
But viewed alongside Congress' abysmal record in asserting its authority
in specific instances, the evidence might also be read more cynically to
suggest that Congress is interested only in a symbolic show of interest, to
appease the public outcry that attends events like Vietnam and the Iran-
Contra affair. 
152
Congress' dismissal of the exceptions clause alternative suggests that
Congress correspondingly is interested in only a symbolic show of inter-
est in social policymaking, merely seeking to appease the yearlong public
outcry raised by Johnson and Eichman. Even so paltry is the whole of
Congressional social policymaking.
150. Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMEs, June 22, 1990, at B5, col. 1.
151. Cole, Book Review, 99 YALE L.J. 2063, 2079 (1990). Congressman David Bonior accused
his House colleagues of failure to go beyond abstract gestures in foreign policy-making:
You people do not have the guts, you do not have the nerve to take responsibility for what the
Constitution has given you. You have given it up. And you gave it up in the 1960's and you got
us involved in Vietnam, and you caused a situation which this country regrets today, and that is
what is involved here.
131 Cong. Rec. H5088 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
152. "If Congress is seeking merely to look good while ducking the issue, however, there is no
reason to tolerate such evasion. It's not Congress' choice; the Constitution allocates responsibilities
as well as powers." Cole, supra note 151, at 2079-80.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A. The Facade of 1989 Congressional Social Policymaking
The preceding discussion has observed that the national policymaking
division of labor between the Supreme Court and Congress has evolved
to their mutual advantage since approximately the 1937-1938 period.
Grasping the political economy logic of their division of labor clarifies
why the Supreme Court could with such self-confidence in 1990 decide
that the 1989 federal Flag Protection Act had been applied in violation of
the first amendment in Eichman.
Congress wants the Supreme Court available to absorb the blame for
unpopular social policy, as surely as Congress wants the Federal Reserve
Board available to shoulder the blame for periodic economic contractions
during its business cycle, and wants a Commander in Chief available to
accept responsibility for his periodic, undeclared foreign wars. Congress,
therefore, lacks the stomach to forthrightly check Supreme Court social
policymaking; to do so would mean Senators and Representatives actu-
ally facing responsibility themselves. And few such profiles in courage
thrive on Capitol Hill.
This clarification constitutes the principal product of the Eichman
opinion. Flagburning now being no longer a forbidden fruit, it might be
even less attractive to protesters than it was before 1989. As even Chief
Justice Rehnquist, author of the bitter dissent in Johnson, told the mid-
1990 Fourth Circuit Conference shortly post-Eichman, "[tihere are not
many people in this country who have burned flags, but now that it has
finally been established as legal, there will be far fewer."' 53
B. The Facade of 1990 Congressional Social Policymaking
A fitting postscript to the 1989-1990 flagburning controversy was the
October 24, 1990, climax to nearly 18 months of divisive debate over
congressional support of the National Endowment for the Arts.'5 4 On
that date, the Senate adopted a bipartisan compromise1. reflecting the
nearly unanimous recommendation of the Labor and Human Resources
Committee, as well as the final position of the House of Representa-
tives.1 56 Amendment 3130 to the Department of the Interior and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1991, approved by a vote
of 73 to 24,157 provided in relevant part:
153. Mauro, Courtside, MIAMI REV., August 8, 1990, at 9, 10, col. 2.
154. Myers, Arts Backers are Pleased By Congress's 3-Year Reauthorization of NEA Without
Restrictions CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 7, 1990, at A19, col. 4.
155. Tolchin, Senate Passes Compromise Bill on Arts Endowment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at
B1, col. 1.
156. 136 Cong. Rec. S 17,987 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Senator Pell).
157. Id. at 17,995.
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The chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts shall estab-
lish sanctions for groups or individuals who receive funds pursuant to the
provisions of section 5 and use such funds to create, produce, or support
a project or production that is found to be obscene under State criminal
laws or is found to be a criminal violation of State child pornography
laws in which the group or individual produced such a project or produc-
tion in the state or States described in the grant award as the site or sites
of the project or production, as determined by the court decision, after
final appeals."'
This means that Congress abandons determinations concerning con-
gressionally-funded obscenity to the judiciary.I 9 Senator Pell explained
to the Senate that "[i]nstead of requiring that the Endowment itself set
standards on what may or may not be obscene, this amendment places
that role in the courts where such a decision truly belongs. ' ' "6
The Senators, most of whom are lawyers, well knew that their lan-
guage allows virtually open-ended federal funding of pornography, if not
of obscenity. The three-prong test for identifying obscenity controllable
by the state demands that: (a) Applying contemporary community stan-
dards, the average person must determine the work overall appealing to
the prurient interest; (b) The work must in a patently offensive fashion
present sexual conduct defined specifically by the state law being applied;
and (c) The work must as a whole lack serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value. 6' The question is whether a reasonable person would
find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in the material
overall, not whether the ordinary member of a given community would
do so.1 62 One reason for calling obscenity an issue of law in Jenkins v.
Georgia 163 was to render the appellate judiciary ultimate arbiter of what
is suppressible.' 6
Just as the Flag Protection Act of 1989 was an empty gesture toward
congressional social policymaking, purportedly forestalling flagburning,
so this 1990 provision constitutes another hollow gesture toward con-
gressional social policymaking, purportedly forestalling taxpayer-subsi-
dized obscenity. In both examples Congress sought credit for popular
policymaking while deliberately delivering their real decisions into the
hands of the federal judiciary. Larry Hart, a spokesperson for Represen-
tative Dana Rohrabacher, declared that the 1990 enactment merely of-
fered "political cover for members of congress who needed to tell their
158. Id. at 17,975 (emphasis added).
159. Zuckman, Congress Removes Restrictions on Federal Arts Funding, CONG. Q., Oct. 27,
1990, at 3613.
160. 136 Cong. Rec. S 17,987 (daily ed. Oct 24, 1990) (statement of Senator Pell).
161. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
162. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
163. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
164. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.10, 338 (3d ed. 1985).
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constituents that they were voting for something other than unrestricted
funding of the N.E.A.."'
165
Congress covets popularity purchased with appropriations for the arts,
but wants the judiciary to bear the responsibility for the controversial art
which Congress actually funds. Compare Congress's direction in the
War Powers Act 1 66 that judges can not interpret appropriations as con-
gressional authorization of military moves, absent express directions to
that effect in legislation. Congress wants the President to bear the re-
sponsibility for the controversial, undeclared foreign wars which Con-
gress actually funds. Such is the policymaking division of labor of the
three branches of the wholly unchecked central government as America
enters 1991.
165. Myers, supra note 154, at A23, col.4.
166. Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before November 7, 1973), including any
provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless the provision specifically authorizes the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this chap-
ter; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legisla-
tion specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of this chapter.
50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1973).
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